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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEAH RICHINS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
VTAH, OTTO A. WIESLEY, CARLYLE 
F. GRONNING, and JOHN R. SCHONE, 
its members, and R I C H A R D G . 
MITCHELL, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10504 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This proceeding is an appeal from the Order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah denying the Petition for 
Re-hearing of the Plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 8, 1963, the defendant, Richard G. Mitchell 
hired the plaintiff to work in a Day-Nite Laundercenter in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The plaintiff was assisting the defendant Mitchell on 
July 2, 1963, with certain repairs to an overhead air con-
ditioner in the building. The grille from the air conditioner 
fell, striking the plaintiff on the head. The plaintiff was 
hospitalized and suffered severe and disabling injuries. 
On June 21, 1964, the plaintiff filed an application for 
benefits before the Industrial Commission of Utah. It was 
subsequently determined that the defendant Mitchell car-
ried no insurance as required by 35-1-46 Utah Code Anno-
ta,ted, 1953, as Amended. The case was noticed for hearing 
on October 21, 1964. 
At the hearing, the question was raised by defendant 
l\fitchell whether the plaintiff had brought the proceeding 
against the right party, that is, her employer, inasmuch as 
at the time of the accident defendant Mitchell was the re-
ceiver of the business, having been appointed in Case No. 
141335, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Commission termin-
ated the hearing, indicating that a medical panel should be 
convened to determine injuries. It was stipulated by coun-
sel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant Mitchell 
that the accident in question arose out of and during th~ 
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course of plaintiff's employment. No testimony was taken, 
nor argument heard, on the question of whether the de-
fendant Mitchell, receiver of the Laundercenter, was the 
employer of the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Statutes. 
By Order of December 10, 1964, the Industrial Com-
i:Jission denied the claim of plaintiff. The Commission sug-
gested in that Order that the claim for compensation for 
injuries would properly lie against Loren and Edith Nelson, 
the party defendants in the civil action in which Richard G. 
il'fi~chell was appointed receiver. 
Plaintiff petitioned the Industrial Commission for a 
re-hearing of her cause on January 6, 1965. Plaintiff sup-
plied, at the request of the Commission, a Brief in support 
of her position. The Petition for Re-Hearing was denied by 
Urder of the Commission of February 3, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court reverse the 
Order of the Industrial Commission, holding as a matter 
of law that defendant Richard G. Mitchell was the em-
ployer of the plaintiff; that the Court remand this case 
to the Industrial Commission for further hearing and an 
<.ppropriate award of compensation. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED 
IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN 
THAT IT ERRED IN HOLDING THE RECEIVER IS 
NOT AN EMPLOYER UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW. 
A. A receiver may be an employer under Work. 
men's Compensation law. 
The limited case law authority is clear that a receiver 
may be an employer, and liable to a workmen's compensa-
tion claimant. The Michigan case of Bredeweg vs. First 
State Bank of Holland, et al, 280 Mich. 247, 273 N.W. 550 
( 1937), involves an injured employee claiming against a 
receiver of a national bank. Judge Butzel states therein, 
"It is entirely within the spirit of the Act (Workmen'~ 
Compensation Statute) that such receiver and conservators 
remain liable under the Act until they withdrew ... Un-
doubtedly, the employees had a right to believe that they 
were being protected under the Act and the liability thus 
created." 
In the case of Urine v. Salina Northern R.R. Co., 104 
Kan. 236, 178 Pac. 614 ( 1919), the defense of a receiver 
was raised by a railroad company and was expressly dis-
allowed. Text authority is found at 99 C.J.S. Workmen's 
Compensation, #40 and #55, wherein it is pointed out, 
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''. .. one who makes a contract of employment as a re-
ceiver is liable to the employee injured on the job ... " 
Further authority is found at Annotation, 111 A.L.R. 
~.28, "Undoubtedly a receiver may be an 'employer' within 
the meaning of that term as used in the State Compensation 
Ad, but whether he is an employer in a particular case is 
to be determined from an examination of the existing facts 
and circumstances." 58 Am. Jur. Workmen's Compensation 
;'.:;:346, ''A receiver appointed or empowered to operate a 
business may be an employer, within the meaning of that 
trrm used in a Compensation Act, and liable as such for 
the payment of compensation for an injury to an em-
ployee ... " 
The Courts of Georgia and New Jersey have passed 
,m the question of whether the definition of employer under 
Workmen's Compensation extends to receivers. Both states, 
as set out in Minchew v. Huston, et al, 193 Georgia 272, 18 
S.E. 2d 487 (1942), and in Michell v. Haines, 122 N.J.L. 
~92, 5 A. 2d 68 (1939), have ruled in favor of inclusion of 
receivers as employers. In 1936, the Pennsylvania Court 
also ruled that a receiver, or conservator of a bank, may 
be an employer for purposes of Workmen's Compensation. 
Indiana has an express statutory provision in its Work-
men's Compensation law that includes a reciever. Acting 
thereunder, the Indiana Supreme Court in Barker v. Eddy, 
~!7 Ind. 94, 185 N.E. 878 (1933), ruled that an employer, 
"includes a receiver who uses the services of another for 
pay in the business of the receivership." The case of An-
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derson v. Polleys, 53 R.I. 182, 165 A. 436 (1933), also hold .. 
that a receiver of a corporation is an employer under the 
\Vorkmen's Compensation law, when the employee w·is , ' no, 
given notice of any change in the relationship of emp1 . 
•0\-
ment. · 
B. ~ ~asic ~olicy of Workmen's Compensation Act 
Is mclus10n of coverage, not exclusion. 
There are many cases arising under Workmen's Com-
pensation statutes which are not covered by the expreso 
language of the statutes. The basic policies of the statutes 
are best furthered by inclusion of the employers-employees 
than by exclusion. 
The case of Caughman v. Columbia YMCA, 212 So.C, 
337, 47 S.E. 2d 788 (1948), clearly states that the defini-
tion of employer should be broadly or liberally construed 
in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Any doubt as 
to jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of inclusion 
rather than exclusion. Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., 
208 So.C. 307 38 S.E. 2d 4 (1946). 
C. The policy of Workmen's Compensation of pro-
tecting a worker from injuries sustained in the 
job would not be effectuated by granting im-
munity to a receiver. 
The policy of Workmen's Compensation is clear that 
a person who hires another and agrees to pay for the serv-
ice of the other must afford some protection to the em-
ployee for on the job injuries. The ruling of the Industrial 
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Commission, however, would allow the receiver an immu-
nity from the rigors of compliance. A receiver, under the 
ruling of the Industrial Commission, could hire, directly su-
pervise and control, pay, or even fire an employee, all with-
riut affording the protection to an employee every other em-
ployer must bear. The statutes would never have been drawn 
contemplating such a manifestly inequitable result. 
In this case, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant 
~VIitchell. The supervision, direction and control over plain-
tiff's on-the-job activities was exercised by the defendant 
Mitchell. The plaintiff was given checks for her services 
from the defendant Mitchell. The withholdng tax or W-2 
form was given plaintiff by defendant Mitchell. 
All of these facts, plus further facts which could be 
developed at a full hearing, are persuasive that the defend-
ant Mitchell was employing the applicant. Mitchell was ap-
prised of the claim of plaintiff; in fact, he made direct pay-
ment of some of her medical bills. The receivership, how-
ever, was allowed to terminate without resolving the claim 
of plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that a reasonable inference 
to be drawn from such an action is that Mtichell himself 
considered the liability, rights, and obligations arising 
from the accident attached to him personally. 
D. Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
Amended, can reasonably be interpreted to in-
clude a receiver as employer. 
The pertinent parts of the statutory section are as fol-
lows: "The following shall constitute employers subject to 
the provisions of this title: (2) Every person, firm and 
private corporation, including every public utility, having 
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in service one or more workmen or operatives regular!. 
employed in the same business, or in or about the same l es. 
tablishment, under any contract of hire, express or em. 
ployed, oral or written, ... " Plaintiff submits that "every 
person" must include the defendant-receiver in order to pro. 
mote the policy of Workmen's Compensation. In Ortega , 
Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 UTAH 1, 156 P.2d 885 
P945), the Chief Justice Larson states, "The Compensation 
Act, first enacted in 1917, is predicated upon the police 
power, the right of the State to regulate the status of em. 
ployer and employee, for the general welfare of the people 
of the state. (Citing cases) It is a beneficent act, passeci 
to protect employees, and those dependent upon them, and 
to tax the costs of human wreckage against the industry 
which employs it, such burden being added to the price of 
the products and thereby spread over the general consum. 
jng users of the product of the industry." p. 887. "It is to 
be liberally construed in favor of the injured workman." 
p. 888. Further, Chief Justice Larson states, "As far as the 
'employer' is concerned, the term is broad enough to cover 
all employment relationships." With this policy and liberal 
rule of construction in mind, the Commission was arbitrary 
and capricious in denying the claim of plaintiff on the 
basis that the receiver was not the employer. 
POINT II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH DENIED 
PLAINTIFF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY DENYING 
HER CLAIM WITHOUT A FULL HEARING. 
At the initial hearing in the Industrial Commision, the 
following events took place: The parties convened, in per-
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son and represented by counsel, before Otto A. Weisley, 
(ine of the members of the Industrial Commission. The 
question was raised by the Commission whether the acci-
dent occurred during the course of plaintiff's employment. 
The parties agreed that the accident happened in the course 
of employment. 
At this point, counsel for Richard G. Mitchell raised 
the question whether the claim of plaintiff was properly 
against Mr. Mitchell, since he was a receiver of the busi-
ness. An informal discusison was had on this question and 
the hearing terminated. Thereafter, the Commission de-
nied plaintiff's claim. 
The Commission heard virtually no testimony, received 
nv evidence, examined no exhibits, and entertained little 
argument before its decision to deny the claim. While 
plaintiff will concede the expertise of the Commission in 
matters relating to employment relationships, it is also 
clear that their decision must be based upon competent 
evidence, from even a minimal record, and cannot be arbi-
trarily given on no evidence at all. 
Due process of law requires that any valuable rights, 
such as those herein of plaintiff, must not be denied with-
out a reasonable basis in fact and law. The decision herein 
was based upon a paucity of fact and, plaintiffs submits, 
was directly contrary to law. 
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POINT III. 
A RECEIVER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE O'i 
CONTRACTS AND THUS LIABLE UNDER WORI: 
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT FOR INJURIES TO AX 
EMPLOYEE INJURED ON THE JOB. 
A corollary and necessary determination is whether , 
receiver may be personally liable on his contracts, and thus 
personally liable to an employee for Workmen's Compen. 
sation. The definitive Tardy's Smith on Receivers points cu 
on page 169, "A receiver may be personally liable in, , 
contract entered into by him without the sanction of 'tht 
Court, even though in relation to a matter which otherwi&: 
would be a charge against the receivership." Further, on 
page 269, "In other words, a receiver has no principal be-
hind him in the sense of an ordinary agent, for whom he 
can promise and hence, unless authorized so to do by the 
Court which appointed him, his promises and contract 
will bind him individually." 
Plaintiff contends that there are sufficient facts be-
fore the Court to hold the defendant Mitchell personally 
liable on the contract of employment of plaintiff. The re-
sult of this finding would clearly leave the plaintiff entitled 
to an award from the Industrial Commission. 
The claim of an injured workman has its basis on the 
contract and fact of employment. It necessarily follows that 
if Mitchell, as receiver, was the employer of plaintiff, anc 
the fact of employment existed, the receiver must be held 
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personally liable for this claim. The plaintiff submits that 
enough fact has been established for the finding of personal 
liability. 
The property and business transferred in the District 
Court proceeding to the receiver was never returned to the 
prior owners. The initial claim herein was processed against 
the "Mitchell Laundercenter." Although it subsequently de-
veloped that defendant has no Workmen's Compensation 
insurance, defendant Mitchell at one time advised the 
plaintiff that insurance was available. If further facts are 
11ecessary to find the personal liability of defendant, a 
hearing could be had for this purpose upon remand. 
Denial of plaintiff's claim would have a curious and 
inequitable result. Plaintiff, an injured worker entitled to 
the protection of the statutes, would have no right of re-
covery. Plaintiff submits that the suggestion of the Com-
mission that the claim should be processed against Loren 
and Edith Nelson, the prior owners of the laundercenter, is 
entirely without legal merit. The Workmen's Compensation 
claim must have a direct relationship to a status of 
employer-employee. Here, the Nelsons neither hired, super-
vised, paid, or in any way controlled the activities of plain-
tiff at the laundercenter. Law and equity would not be 
served by shifting the responsibility and liability of the 
one who hired plaintiff to strangers to this proceeding. 
75 C.J.S. Receivers #157, clearly points out that a re-
ceiver who hires agents or employees to assist him in the 
conduct of the business, without specific approval of the 
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Court, does so "at his peril." "His authority to enter into 
such employment contracts includes the usual obligations o; 
8Uch contracts." p. 797. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Industrial Commission acted in excess of ii, 
powers in determining as a matter of law that defendant 
Mitchell was not the employer of plaintiff. 
2. The Commission acted in excess of its powers o:' 
denying plaintiff's claim without a full hearing as required 
by due process of law. 
3. The Order of the Commission is arbitrary and ca-
pricious and has no basis in fact or law; and the findings 
of fact herein do not support denial of plaintiff's claim. 
4. The cause should be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for an appropriate award of compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
IRENE WARR 
LAREN D. BATES 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
